Define data sovereignty by legal control, not only data location
7 submissions. Each submission counts once for this shared ask. Counts do not measure importance or merit.
A shared ask groups requests for substantially the same action from three or more submissions when the group was created. Groups remain listed if withdrawals reduce their counts. AI models summarised recommendations, grouped them and checked the groups. The label summarises the requests; it is not a quote. A shared ask does not mean agreement on anything else.
Theme: Data sovereignty and residency
Recommendations from submissions
Quotes are the submitter’s own words. Text taken from documents, including scanned pages read by text-recognition software, can differ from the PDF. Check the original. Extracts are chosen by an AI model. Submissions are listed in submission number order; recommendations follow their order on each submission’s page.
Attestor Pty Ltd Submission 58
Recognise data sovereignty, meaning Australian residency plus freedom from foreign extraterritorial access, as an enabler of SME adoption in regulated professions, with adoption support neutral as to deployment model but specific as to that outcome.
Recognise data sovereignty, meaning Australian residency together with freedom from foreign extraterritorial access, as an enabler of small and medium enterprise (SME) adoption in regulated professions, and frame adoption support so that it is neutral as to deployment model but specific as to that outcome.
MDR Security Submission 137
Assess foreign-interference risk beyond data location: system operators, foreign governments’ powers to compel data access or service withdrawal, and continuity if a foreign supplier withdraws.
Assessments of foreign interference risk should not simply focus on where data is stored, but instead consider who operates an AI system, which foreign governments can compel access to the data or withdrawal of the service, and whether the function could keep running if a foreign supplier withdrew.
A program corrected obvious text-recognition errors in this quote for display.
National Open Science Taskforce (NOST) Submission 187
Recognise that data sovereignty extends beyond domestic hosting or ownership to rights, obligations, provenance, privacy, confidentiality, cultural protocols and community authority in the Committee’s consideration of Australian data and domain-specific models.
Data sovereignty should not be understood only as domestic hosting or Australian ownership. The Committee’s consideration of Australian data and domain-specific models should recognise that data is governed by rights, obligations, provenance, privacy, confidentiality, cultural protocols and community authority.
Kitbag Consulting Submission 198
Classify AI/cloud sovereignty before purchase by supplier, operating-entity and ultimate-parent domicile and foreign legal exposure, rather than data or infrastructure location.
Implement a tiered sovereignty classification for AI and cloud procurements. Assess sovereignty based on the legal domicile of the supplier, its operating entity and its ultimate parent company and the foreign jurisdictions to which each may be subject, rather than the location in which data or infrastructure is held. Apply this tiered classification at the point of purchase to establish sovereign characteristics before contractual commitment.
Samantha Connor AM Submission 229
Treat data sovereignty as control rather than geography. Procurement must assess ownership, governing law, foreign access, model control, auditability, vendor dependence and Australia's practical ability to replace the supplier.
Treat data sovereignty as control rather than geography. Procurement must assess ownership, governing law, foreign access, model control, auditability, vendor dependence and Australia's practical ability to replace the supplier.
Global Data Alliance (GDA) Submission 402
Define data sovereignty through effective control—access, security, governance, auditability and accountability—rather than exclusive Australian storage or processing.
For purposes of Term of Reference (f), data sovereignty should principally mean effective control over data —including access, security, governance, auditability and accountability — rather than a requirement that data be stored or processed exclusively within Australia.
Ms Jessica Browne Submission 555
Treat data sovereignty as more than data residency, considering storage, processing, controlling entities, foreign jurisdictions, subprocessors and cross-border legal access; Australian hosting alone should not establish sovereignty.
Treat data sovereignty as more than data residency. Policy should consider where information is stored, where and by whom it is processed, which corporate entities control it, applicable foreign jurisdictions, subprocessors and cross-border legal-access regimes, including the Australia-US CLOUD Act framework. Australian hosting alone should not be treated as establishing Australian sovereignty.