AI Inquiry Atlas

An unofficial, independent guide to the public records of the Joint Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence. Not connected with the Parliament of Australia or the committee. Its makers also made a submission (no. 481; see About). Summaries and scores are written by AI and can be wrong: check the original before relying on them.

Require screening of synthetic DNA imports through biosecurity import conditions

5 submissions. Each submission counts once for this shared ask. Counts do not measure importance or merit.

A shared ask groups requests for substantially the same action from three or more submissions when the group was created. Groups remain listed if withdrawals reduce their counts. AI models summarised recommendations, grouped them and checked the groups. The label summarises the requests; it is not a quote. A shared ask does not mean agreement on anything else.

Theme: AI-enabled biological risks

Recommendations from submissions

Quotes are the submitter’s own words. Text taken from documents, including scanned pages read by text-recognition software, can differ from the PDF. Check the original. Extracts are chosen by an AI model. Submissions are listed in submission number order; recommendations follow their order on each submission’s page.

  1. Good Ancestors Submission 257

    1. Require imported synthetic nucleic acids to come from providers that screen orders, via import permit conditions.

      Add a condition to import permits in the Biosecurity Import Conditions system (BICON) requiring that synthetic nucleic acids come only from providers that screen orders for dangerous sequences.

  2. Ms Janet Egan Submission 323

    1. Require security screening of synthetic DNA orders, which the author says can be applied to all synthetic DNA imports under the Director of Biosecurity's existing import-permit powers without new legislation.

      Requiring security screening of synthetic DNA orders is a much more feasible approach. Synthetic DNA is a necessary input to most pathways of concern in pandemic-capable pathogen development, and its production is concentrated in a small number of companies and countries. Australia can move quickly: the Biosecurity Act 2015 already empowers the Director of Biosecurity to impose conditions on import permits, so a screening requirement can be applied to all imports of synthetic DNA without new legislation.

  3. Mr Edward Burrowes Submission 467

    1. Have the Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Minister direct Biosecurity’s Director to impose sequence-screening and customer-verification conditions on synthetic-nucleic-acid BICON imports this year, without legislation.

      Recommend that the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry direct the Director of Biosecurity to impose sequence screening and customer verification conditions on BICON import permits for synthetic nucleic acids. This requires no legislation and can be done this year.

  4. Mr Zac Broeren Submission 497

    1. Require synthetic nucleic acids to be imported from providers screening orders for sequences of concern and verifying customer identity, as a BICON import condition.

      Require, as a BICON import condition, that synthetic nucleic acids be sourced from providers that screen orders for sequences of concern and verify customer identity.

  5. Australian Council on AI Strategy (ACAIS) Submission 513

    1. Use the Director of Biosecurity’s BICON powers immediately, without new legislation, to require imported synthetic nucleic acids to come from providers screening orders for sequences of concern.

      Australia's Biosecurity Import Conditions system (BICON) gives the Director of Biosecurity the power to impose conditions on imported synthetic nucleic acids. This should be done immediately, and can be achieved without new legislation. Members of the International Gene Synthesis Consortium, already voluntarily screen orders for sequences of concern. Australia's current import permit system does not require that synthetic nucleic acids be sourced from providers that screen, and bad actors can exploit this. The current arrangement poses an unacceptable risk under the Biosecurity Act 2015. This should be remedied immediately and quickly without the need for legislative change.

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