AI Inquiry Atlas

An unofficial, independent guide to the public records of the Joint Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence. Not connected with the Parliament of Australia or the committee. Its makers also made a submission (no. 481; see About). Summaries and scores are written by AI and can be wrong: check the original before relying on them.

Submission 309

Australian Electoral Commission (AEC)

Submitter group: Government.

An AI model identified the submitter group and wrote the summary, key points and recommendation summaries. Counts do not measure importance or merit.

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Summary

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Describes the AEC's cautious, limited use of AI and its concerns about AI risks to electoral integrity, including deepfakes, disinformation, foreign interference and AI-enabled information intermediaries. States that any AI regulation would need careful guardrails and flexibility. Describes its consideration of deepfake labelling, its limited legal authority, and education work.

Key points

Quotes are the submitter’s own words. Text taken from documents, including scanned pages read by text-recognition software, can differ from the PDF. Check the original. Listed in the same order as on the submission’s page in the interactive guide.

  1. States that trusted electoral outcomes depend on transparent, human-led processes, with technology serving as a tool to support, not replace, those responsibilities.

    However, as technology evolves, the foundations of Australian federal elections remain unchanged: trusted electoral outcomes depend on transparent, human-led processes, with technology serving as a tool to support, not replace, those responsibilities.

  2. States that AI can amplify existing threats to electoral integrity such as disinformation, foreign interference and impersonation.

    AI can act as an amplifier and accelerant to existing threats to electoral integrity, such as mis/disinformation, foreign interference, impersonation, inauthentic campaigning and the harassment of election officials.

  3. States that AI makes it more difficult to distinguish authentic from manipulated content and increases confusion about authoritative sources.

    As these technologies evolve, they make it more difficult for people to distinguish between authentic and manipulated content, increase confusion about authoritative sources of information, and create challenges for EMBs who must maintain trust, accuracy and transparency in communications.

  4. Says provisions restricting foreign electoral spending are very challenging to enforce on people in foreign countries.

    While the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 restricts foreign campaigners from incurring electoral expenditure or fundraising for the purpose of influencing the result of federal elections, these legislative provisions are very challenging to enforce on those in foreign countries.

  5. Says voters increasingly access electoral information through AI-enabled intermediaries such as chatbots and AI search summaries.

    Voters are increasingly accessing electoral information through AI-enabled intermediaries rather than directly from authoritative sources. Search engines now routinely provide AI-generated summaries, chatbots increasingly function as information intermediaries, and social media platforms are introducing AI-generated responses within their products.

  6. States that it has no legal authority to regulate electoral AI communication beyond its delegated authorisation determination power.

    The AEC does not have any legal authority to regulate electoral related AI communication outside of this delegated power to issue an Authorisation Determination. Any further regulatory role and power is a matter for Parliament.

Recommendations

Recommendations are shown beside the submission’s own words. Listed in the same order as on its page in the interactive guide.

  1. If AI regulation is pursued, establish flexible guardrails that allow the AEC to operate, respect implied political communication freedoms and avoid unduly limiting electoral participants’ AI benefits.

    Regulation may be able to play a role in mitigating that concern, however it would require careful consideration to not overstep the bounds of the implied freedom of political communication, nor unduly limit the benefits AI could present to participants in the electoral process. Therefore, any AI regulation would need to establish careful guardrails with sufficient flexibility within which the AEC could effectively operate.

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