AI Inquiry Atlas

An unofficial, independent guide to the public records of the Joint Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence. Not connected with the Parliament of Australia or the committee. Its makers also made a submission (no. 481; see About). Summaries and scores are written by AI and can be wrong: check the original before relying on them.

Submission 430

Mr Nigel Preston

Submitter group: Individuals.

Position labels are not shown for individual submitters.

An AI model identified the submitter group and wrote the summary, key points and recommendation summaries. Counts do not measure importance or merit.

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Summary

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Argues AI displacement requires employer-funded income continuity. Offers a provisional draft covering protected positions, phased worker obligations, retraining, a living wage and border charges, with a ten-year sunset and possible extension. Says predictions remain uncertain, identifies drafting weaknesses and unsettled trade compatibility, and requests legal/economic review and immediate State referral negotiations. Intends to slow adoption while preserving deployment freedom.

Key points

Quotes are the submitter’s own words. Text taken from documents, including scanned pages read by text-recognition software, can differ from the PDF. Check the original. Listed in the same order as on the submission’s page in the interactive guide.

  1. Argues that AI is being sold to business to reduce labour costs, so worker displacement follows when it performs as sold.

    Artificial intelligence is being sold to business for the purpose of reducing the cost of labour. When it performs as sold, workers lose their jobs.

  2. Argues that displacement is not a side effect of the AI investment thesis but the thesis itself, because returns can only come from business cost reduction.

    The only revenue base large enough is business, buying artificial intelligence to deploy in its operations and reduce costs. Any business that runs on labour reduces its costs by displacing workers. Displacement is therefore not a side effect of the AI investment thesis. It is the investment thesis.

  3. Argues employers replacing workers with AI should keep paying until other employment or expiry of the legislation.

    An employer who replaces a worker with an artificial intelligence system should not be released from the obligation to keep paying that worker. Payment continues until the worker obtains other employment, or until the legislation expires.

  4. Argues a developer levy is legally doubtful, would face years of litigation and is unlikely to deliver timely funding; does not rule out drafting one.

    We do not say that no such levy could ever be drafted. We say it is legally doubtful, that its validity would be litigated for years, and that it is unlikely to produce money at the time and in the place where money is needed.

  5. Says a January 2025 House committee found the regulatory landscape insufficient for ADM and AI impacts on workplaces.

    In January 2025 the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Employment, Education and Training found that "the current regulatory landscape in Australia is not sufficient to deal with the impacts of ADM and AI on workplaces", and that rapid digital transformation had exposed concerning regulatory gaps in worker protections.

  6. States that the proposal would slow but not stop AI adoption, to allow time to retrain and adjust.

    The proposal would slow the adoption of artificial intelligence in Australia. It would not stop it. That is its purpose: to buy ten or twenty years in which this country can retrain and adjust.

Recommendations

Recommendations are shown beside the submission’s own words. Listed in the same order as on its page in the interactive guide.

  1. Find AI-driven workforce displacement a first-order economic/social risk, more immediate than catastrophic scenarios and unaddressed by existing Australian law.

    That it find that workforce displacement caused by artificial intelligence is a first order economic and social risk to Australia, distinct from and considerably more immediate than the catastrophic risk scenarios which dominate public discussion, and that it is not addressed by any existing Australian law.

  2. Find Commonwealth/State fiscal capacity insufficient for mass-displacement income continuity and that a response relying on government expenditure will not be delivered.

    That it find that neither the Commonwealth nor the States has the fiscal capacity to provide income continuity at the scale mass displacement would require, and that a response depending on government expenditure will not be delivered.

  3. Find enterprise-level Fair Work rules unable to manage market-level displacement.

    That it find that the Fair Work framework, being calibrated to enterprise level change, cannot manage a phenomenon that operates at the level of the market.

  4. Recommend, as a matter of principle, that the cost of AI-driven displacement be borne by the employer that deploys the system and captures the productivity gain, not the displaced worker or the welfare system.

    That it recommend, as a matter of principle, that the cost of AI driven displacement be borne by the employer that deploys the system and captures the productivity gain, rather than by the displaced worker or the welfare system.

  5. Recommend development of Commonwealth legislation giving effect to that principle, taking the draft at Annexure A as a working text.

    That it recommend the development of Commonwealth legislation giving effect to that principle, and that the draft at Annexure A be taken as a working text for that purpose.

  6. Recommend an independent legal review of the draft, directed to section 51(xxxi), referral architecture, border charge provisions and trade obligations, plus independent economic modelling of fiscal, productivity and competitiveness effects.

    That it recommend an independent legal review of that draft, directed in particular to section 51(xxxi), the referral architecture, the border charge provisions and Australia's trade obligations, together with independent economic modelling of the fiscal, productivity and competitiveness effects.

  7. Begin State/Territory referral negotiations immediately, before introducing a Bill.

    That it recommend that negotiations with the States and Territories on referral of power begin immediately, and not await the introduction of a Bill, given the time such negotiations have historically required.

  8. Provide a ten-year sunset on 31 December 2036, extending to 2046 only after independent review and a positive parliamentary vote; default to termination.

    The Act is explicitly transitional. It sets a sunset date of 31 December 2036 (a 10- year term starting from the Transition Date), with provision to extend until 31 December 2046 following an independent review and a positive parliamentary vote. If Parliament does not act, the Act will end. The default position is sunset, not continuation: inaction results in termination.

  9. Note that each month of delay increases both the number of workers displaced without protection and the retrospective reach of any eventual legislation, so that speed is a strategic as well as a moral consideration.

    That it note that every month of delay increases both the number of workers displaced without protection and the retrospective reach of any eventual legislation, and that speed is therefore a strategic as well as a moral consideration.

  10. Weigh both error risks: a scheme can sunset if displacement is mild, while rapid displacement without it may cause irreversible losses.

    If no scheme is legislated and displacement proves rapid, the damage is neither modest nor recoverable. Careers ended in a worker's fifties do not resume in their sixties. Homes lost to mortgage default are not returned when the economy recovers. A generation that never gained a foothold does not get a second start. That asymmetry is, in our submission, decisive. It is the reasoning the precautionary principle applies in environmental decision making: where the potential harm is serious and substantially irreversible, the absence of complete certainty is not a reason to delay.

  11. Redraft the Neutral Productivity Test’s AI-competitor loophole and unequal treatment of domestic AI-native firms relative to offshore producers.

    The Neutral Productivity Test may give an unintended exit to an incumbent losing market share to an AI native competitor, because that incumbent can point to a genuine, externally caused decline. And a domestic enterprise that is AI native from the outset bears no obligation equivalent to the border charges applied to offshore producers, which is unfair to established Australian employers and weakens the national treatment answer. Both require redrafting.

  12. Introduce domestic obligations and import measures as a complete package; model and legally review challenged border provisions before introduction.

    It is the reason the draft includes the border provisions described in Part 8.5, and the reason we say the legislation must be introduced as a complete package. A domestic obligation without import measures would not be a half measure. It would be a mechanism for destroying Australian jobs, because Australian firms would bear a cost their competitors do not. We acknowledge that the border provisions are the part of the draft most exposed to challenge, and that the international precedent on which they are modelled is itself contested. They should be modelled and legally reviewed before introduction, not after.

  13. In the working draft, protect every position existing on the Transition Date, maintain pay and benefits after automation, and index remuneration to CPI without downward adjustments.

    Every employment position in Australia existing on the Transition Date automatically becomes a Protected Employment Slot (Part III). A worker holding a Slot remains entitled to remuneration and benefits if an artificial intelligence system takes over their duties. An enterprise may automate every task a worker performs. It must still pay the worker. Remuneration is indexed to the Consumer Price Index, with no downward adjustment if the index falls.

  14. Working-draft proposal: preserve protected positions after an occupant leaves, allowing another worker to fill them.

    The Act protects Slots rather than individuals, so a Slot survives the departure of its occupant and may be filled by another worker.

  15. Working-draft proposal: preserve freedom to deploy AI without approval or consultation and ordinary management prerogatives, while maintaining displaced workers’ income.

    The Part concludes with a carefully drafted Preservation of Management Rights section. This is strategically important. It makes explicit that the Act does not restrict an Enterprise's right to implement AI without prior approval, manage its affairs, determine business strategy, set performance standards, or exercise any other management prerogatives. The Act doesn't require consultation before AI implementation, doesn't regulate how AI systems are used, and doesn't interfere with legitimate business decisions unrelated to worker displacement.

  16. Working-draft proposal: cover platform/gig and labour-hire workers.

    Workers whose labour is mediated by technology, specifically platform workers and gig workers, are explicitly included. The rise of platform-mediated work (Uber, DoorDash, Upwork, Airtasker, etc.) has created millions of workers who perform genuine work but fall outside traditional employment law. The Act protects them. Workers engaged through labour hire, staffing agencies, or employment intermediaries are included. These workers often perform the same tasks as direct employees but are technically employed by intermediaries. The Act looks through this structure to protect the workers regardless of the intermediary arrangement.

  17. Working-draft proposal: exclude private-company directors/shareholders, unpaid volunteers, non-commercial recreational activity and genuinely casual work averaging less than one day monthly from protected slots.

    15. The following are not covered by Protected Employment Slots: iibsie 15.2. 15.3. 15.4. 15.5. company directors of private companies shareholders of private companies; volunteers who receive no remuneration; persons engaged in a hobby or other recreational activities without a commercial purpose; or Workers whose employment is genuinely casual, sporadic, and less than one day per month on average.

  18. Working-draft proposal: deem personal-service workers employed by ultimate recipients where tax law attributes income through intermediaries.

    Personal services provided through interposed entities are dealt with by cross reference to the personal services income regime in the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (section 6). Where that Act would attribute income to the individual rather than the entity, the individual is deemed to be employed by the ultimate recipient of the services. This borrows two decades of settled authority rather than inventing a parallel body of law.

  19. Working-draft proposal: require employer slot registers, updated within 14 days, kept seven years after cessation and available to the ECA and affected workers within seven days.

    For each Slot, the register must record the worker's details, the date the Slot was created, the complete Key Information (as defined in section 5), any adjustments to that information, records of AI Systems affecting the Slot, and records of associated Productivity Gains. The register must be kept in an ECA-approved form, updated within 14 days of any material change, retained for at least 7 years after a Slot ceases, and produced to the ECA within 7 days on request. Workers are also entitled to access their own Slot records within 7 days.

  20. Working-draft proposal: allow slot-information amendments only for legal/award/agreement compliance, written worker consent, ECA approval or Tribunal order.

    21. An Enterprise may amend Key Information for a Protected Employment Slot only: 21.1. to comply with changes in applicable laws, awards, or Enterprise agreements; 21.2. with the Worker's written consent; 21.3. with ECA approval; or 21.4. pursuant to an order of the Tribunal.

  21. Working-draft proposal: give redeployed workers the greater of CPI or ordinary career progression.

    There's an important exception for workers performing Appropriate Alternative Work. Those workers get the greater of CPI increases or normal career progression for their new role. This is a sensible provision. It means a worker who successfully transitions into alternative work isn't locked into mere inflation adjustments but can advance through promotions, merit increases, and professional progression just like any other worker in that role.

  22. Working-draft proposal: set growth thresholds/formulas through actuarial regulation, review biennially, give smaller businesses higher thresholds and exempt one-off acquisition growth.

    The specific thresholds for growth (for example, 20% revenue increase over 2 years, 30% over 3 years) and their formulas are determined by regulation rather than being fixed in the Act. This allows them to be fine-tuned through actuarial analysis and adjusted every 2 years based on actual experience. Smaller businesses face higher thresholds before obligations kick in, and one-off growth events like acquisitions are exempt.

  23. Working-draft proposal: require annual growth reports above $10 million profit, civil penalties of 100 units per missing slot, back-pay and ECA creation orders.

    Enterprises with profits exceeding $10 million must submit annual growth reports. Failure to create required Slots attracts civil penalties of 100 penalty units per missing Slot, plus back-payment obligations and ECA orders to create the Slots.

  24. Working-draft proposal: permit slot elimination only after the enterprise proves sustained externally caused business contraction.

    The core principle is that an Enterprise can only eliminate a Slot if it demonstrates that the dominant purpose is a sustained decline in business activity caused by external factors, such as market conditions, demographic shifts, recession, or other forces outside the Enterprise's control. The burden of proof rests entirely with the Enterprise.

  25. Working-draft proposal: use tiered contraction evidence: under $1 million revenue, 30% over six months; $1–100 million, 20% over nine; above $100 million, 15% over twelve; thresholds alone do not disprove AI causation.

    The evidentiary thresholds are tiered by Enterprise size — smaller businesses (under $1 million) must show a 30% decline over 6 months, mid-range ($1M–$100M) must show 20% over 9 months, and large enterprises (over $100M) must show 15% over 12 months. Meeting these thresholds creates only a rebuttable presumption of sustained decline. It doesn't prove the decline is unrelated to AI.

  26. Working-draft proposal: require financial/operational evidence, external-cause evidence, AI/gains declarations and justification of specific slot removals and why alternatives are insufficient.

    The submission requirements are extensive: financial records, operational data, evidence of external causation, a full declaration of all AI systems implemented and their productivity gains, and a detailed justification explaining why elimination of specific Slots is necessary and why alternatives like redeployment or reduced hours are insufficient.

  27. Working-draft proposal: have the ECA decide contraction applications within 60 days, with fresh Tribunal appeals and Federal Court appeals on law.

    The ECA must determine applications within 60 days, and affected workers have a right of de novo appeal to the Tribunal, meaning the Tribunal reconsiders the matter entirely from scratch, not just reviewing for error. Appeals can go further to the Federal Court on questions of law.

  28. Working-draft proposal: establish a quarterly displacement index weighted by displacement/job openings (40%), re-employment time (30%), wage reductions (20%) and sector concentration (10%).

    The LMDI is a quarterly index scaled from 0 (no displacement impact) to 1 (complete labour market failure), calculated from four weighted factors: the ratio of displaced workers to available job openings (40%), how long displaced workers take to find comparable employment (30%), the wage reduction they must accept (20%), and how concentrated displacement is in particular sectors (10%).

  29. Working-draft proposal: apply job-search obligations only where displacement exceeds 33%; other workers retain normal employment/full pay without an alternative-work search requirement.

    60. The obligations in sections 62 to 72 apply only to Workers whose Displacement Percentage exceeds 33%. 61. A Worker whose Displacement Percentage is 33% or less continues in normal employment with full remuneration and is not required to seek alternative employment.

  30. Working-draft proposal: in Phase 1, below 0.30 displacement-index value, require eight comparable-job applications monthly, monthly reports and acceptance absent good cause; exempt $200 weekly before full income offsets; reduce pay to 70% for three-month non-compliance.

    Phase 1 (LMDI below 0.30 — Minimal Displacement): The labour market is functioning. Workers whose displacement exceeds 33% must actively seek work — at least 8 applications per month for comparable positions, monthly reporting, and must accept comparable offers unless they have good cause to refuse. Alternative income is offset dollar-for-dollar (with a $200/week exemption to incentivise work). Non-compliance reduces the Protected Slot payment to 70% for 3 months.

  31. Working-draft proposal: in Phase 2, index 0.30–0.70, make search voluntary and refusals penalty-free, with quarterly reporting and 50% income offsets.

    Phase 2 (LMDI 0.30–0.70 — Moderate Displacement): The market is stressed. Workers are encouraged but not required to seek work. They must report quarterly rather than monthly, can decline offers without penalty, and alternative income offsets at only 50%.

  32. Working-draft proposal: in Phase 3, index above 0.70, remove search/acceptance penalties, require annual reporting and apply 25% income offsets.

    Phase 3 (LMDI above 0.70 — Severe Displacement): The market has failed. Workers have no obligation to seek work and may pursue any productive activity — education, entrepreneurship, community service, creative work, caregiving. They are required to report annually, with no penalties, and alternative income offsets at just 25%.

  33. Working-draft proposal: retain the $200 weekly income exemption with Phase 2’s 50% offset.

    73.3 In this Phase, alternative income offsets are calculated at 50% rather than dollar-for-dollar (except the $200 weekly exemption still applies).

  34. Working-draft proposal: where AI replaces more than 33% of protected duties, require reasonable steps to offer appropriate internal work.

    75 When an Enterprise implements an AI system that replaces more than 33% of a Worker’s duties in a Protected Employment Slot, the Enterprise must take reasonable steps to offer the Worker Appropriate Alternative Work within the Enterprise.

  35. Working-draft proposal: require alternative work at comparable skill, within reasonable commuting distance and capacity with reasonable training, with conditions not substantially inferior and at least two-thirds original hours/workload.

    Before a worker receives remuneration without performing duties, the enterprise must take reasonable steps to offer Appropriate Alternative Work, that is, work at a comparable skill level, within reasonable commuting distance, within the worker's capacity given their qualifications and any reasonable training the enterprise provides, with conditions not substantially inferior to the original role, and comprising at least two-thirds of the original hours or workload.

  36. Working-draft proposal: give workers fourteen days to accept or dispute an alternative-work offer, deeming it appropriate if unchallenged.

    The process requires the Enterprise to notify the worker in writing that the offer is made under the Act and that the Enterprise considers it Appropriate Alternative Work. The worker has 14 days to accept or dispute. If they don't dispute within 14 days, the work is deemed Appropriate Alternative Work.

  37. Working-draft proposal: permit performance dismissal after consistent standards, reasonable adjustment, warnings and improvement opportunities; preserve the slot for another worker.

    There's also a carefully drafted performance provision. A worker who accepts alternative work and then fails to meet reasonable performance standards can be terminated, but only if the standards are applied consistently with other workers in comparable roles, the worker was given a reasonable adjustment period to acquire competence, and they received written warnings and a reasonable opportunity to improve. If terminated, the Protected Employment Slot itself survives and can be filled by another worker,

  38. Working-draft proposal: allocate AI productivity gains in order: slot pay/benefits/progression/redeployment, retraining, backstop fund, ECA costs, then unrestricted enterprise residual; cover slot shortfalls from revenue.

    An enterprise deploying artificial intelligence must apply the resulting productivity gains in a fixed order of priority before any distribution to shareholders or executives: first, Slot obligations in full; second, retraining and reskilling for affected workers; third, a contribution to a general fund providing backstop support where an individual enterprise cannot meet its obligations; fourth, the regulator's administration and enforcement costs; and fifth, and only then, the residual gain, which the enterprise retains without restriction. If gains fall short, the enterprise funds the shortfall from revenue.

  39. Working-draft proposal: calculate AI gains annually against pre-AI baselines, net of AI costs, using reasonable attribution and inclusion where uncertain.

    Enterprises must annually identify a baseline (performance before AI implementation), measure improvements attributable to the AI system (increased revenue, reduced costs, improved efficiency), deduct all AI-related costs, and apply reasonable attribution where multiple factors contributed. Importantly, where there's uncertainty about whether gains are AI-attributable, the Enterprise must err on the side of inclusion.

  40. Working-draft proposal: require annual ECA compliance reports on AI systems, gains, distributions and full slot funding within four months of year-end.

    The Part then sets out Enterprise obligations: annual calculation of Productivity Gains, application according to the Waterfall, detailed record-keeping, and annual reports to the ECA documenting compliance, including identification of all AI systems, calculation of gains, how gains were distributed, and confirmation that all Slot obligations are fully funded. Reports are due within 4 months of the financial year-end.

  41. Working-draft proposal: provide a living wage for tax residents aged 18 to under 65 unable to secure a slot within six months of education or workforce return, actively seeking unless Phase 3, with income at most 60% of median full-time earnings.

    111 A person is eligible for Living Wage support if: 111.1 they are a natural person aged 18 or above, but below the age of 65; 111.2 they are an Australian resident for income tax purposes; 111.3 they are unable to secure a Protected Employment Slot within 6 months of: 111.3.1 completing education or training; or 111.3.2. becoming available for work after a period of absence (parenting, illness, caregiving); 111.4 they.are actively seeking employment (unless Phase’3 applies); and 111.5 their income from all sources does not exceed 60% of median full- time earnings.

  42. Working-draft proposal: require at least twenty documented slot applications and no unjustified refusal, with unavailable opportunities or inadequate competitive qualifications relevant to living-wage eligibility.

    112 ‘Unable to secure a Protected Employment Slot’ means: 112.1 the person has applied for at least 20.positions that are Protected Employment Slots (or would be if filled); 112.2 the person has documented their applications and efforts; 112.3 the person has not refused suitable offers without good reason; 112.4 the person lacks the specific qualifications or experience that would make them competitive for available Slots; or 112.5 available Slots do not exist in numbers sufficient to employ all eligible Workers.

  43. Working-draft proposal: set living-wage amounts by annually reviewed regulation, covering essential living costs and human dignity.

    114 The Living Wage amount is set by regulation and must be reviewed annually. 115 The Living Wage must be sufficient to: 115.1 maintain a reasonable standard of living; 115.2 cover essential costs, including housing, food, healthcare, transportation, education, and social participation; 115.3 enable recipients to engage in job search, training, or skill development without destitution; 115.4 maintain human dignity and social inclusion; and 115.5 prevent poverty while encouraging transition to employment when opportunities exist.

  44. Working-draft proposal: for living-wage earnings, exempt $300 weekly, offset $300–600 at 50% and amounts above $600 fully; cease benefits above 60% of median full-time earnings.

    121 Living Wage recipients may engage in part-time work or casual employment: 121.1 121.2 121.3 121.4 income up to $300 per week is exempt (not counted against the 60% income limit); income between $300-$600 per week offsets the Living Wage at the rate of 50%; income above $600 per week offsets Living Wage dollar-for-dollar; if total income exceeds 60% of median full-time earnings, the Living Wage ceases.

  45. Working-draft proposal: require living-wage recipients’ phase-appropriate obligations, approved training if offered, income/circumstance reports and ECA reviews.

    119 Living Wage recipients must: 119.1 119.2 119.3 119.4 119.5 119.6 119.7 be available for work (unless Phase 3 applies or they are engaged in approved training); comply with Phase-appropriate obligations (job search in Phase 1, reduced obligations in Phases 2-3); participate in approved retraining or skill development programs if offered; report income from all sources; notify changes in circumstances within 14 days; report quarterly (or as otherwise specified for the applicable Phase); and participate in ECA assessments or reviews when requested.

  46. Working-draft proposal: fund living wages through the continuity fund, Commonwealth appropriations, regulated enterprise contributions, IEIC and other regulated sources.

    125 Living Wage funding comes from: 125.1 125.2 125.3 125.4 125.5 the National Employment Continuity Fund; Commonwealth appropriations; contributions from Enterprises as required by regulation; IEIC revenue allocated to the Living Wage Fund; and other sources specified by regulation.

  47. Working-draft proposal: establish an independent 5–7-member sunset panel by 1 January 2033, using open merit-based appointments and broad consultation, with an evidence-based report by end-2033.

    The Independent Sunset Review process is triggered well in advance. By 1 January 2033 (three years before sunset), the Minister must establish a Review Panel of 5–7 members with collective expertise in labour economics, AI technology, business operations, union representation, and public policy. Appointments must be merit-based through an open process. The Panel must consult widely, including public submissions, hearings in multiple locations, stakeholder engagement, academic research, and international experience. Their comprehensive report is due by 31 December 2033, with clear recommendations: sunset, extend, or extend with modifications, supported by detailed reasoning and minority reports if members disagree.

  48. Working-draft proposal: on sunset, continue slot benefits 24 months and living wages 12 months without new applications; retain ECA/Tribunal for 30 months before transferring remaining functions.

    The wind-down procedures are carefully staged if the Act does sunset: Protected Employment Slot obligations continue for 24 months. Workers continue to receive full benefits during this period, and all provisions of Parts III–IX remain in force. Living Wage continues for 12 months, with no new applications accepted after sunset. The ECA and Tribunal continue operating for 30 months to administer the wind-down and resolve pending matters, after which the remaining functions transfer to the appropriate Commonwealth agencies.

  49. Working-draft proposal: allocate remaining National Employment Continuity and Living Wage funds: 40% worker transition, 30% State employment support, 20% Commonwealth debt and 10% contingency, subject to regulated variation.

    142 The National Employment Continuity Fundsand Living Wage Fund balances remaining after funding the 2-year continuation period shall be allocated to those bodies that will achieve the following: 142.1 142.2 142.3 142.4 40% to support Worker transition programs (retraining, credential programs, employment services); 30% to supplement State employment support systems; 20% to reduce Commonwealth debt; 10% to contingency reserve for unforeseen costs during wind- down. Specific allocation may be varied by regulation if the circumstances warrant.

  50. Working-draft proposal: if extended to 2046, create a 7–11-member Future Economic Models Commission by January 2040, considering UBI, stakeholder capitalism, worker ownership, profit-sharing and other frameworks; report by end-2043 for parliamentary action by end-2045.

    If the Act is extended to 2046, there's a further mechanism: by 1 January 2040, the Minister must establish a Future Economic Models Commission of 7–11 members to investigate long-term policy frameworks for an AI-dominant economy. This Commission has an explicitly visionary mandate. It must consider UBI, stakeholder capitalism, worker ownership, profit-sharing, or entirely new structures, and address fundamental questions about human purpose, dignity, and flourishing in a world where AI performs most cognitive work. Critically, its recommendations will be grounded in 15–20 years of empirical experience rather than the speculation that would characterise any such exercise today. The Commission must report by 31 December 2043, and Parliament must complete legislative action on successor frameworks by 31 December 2045.

  51. Working-draft proposal: permit emergency extensions up to twelve months for genuine review delays, sudden economic deterioration or other emergencies; require parliamentary decision before expiry or automatic sunset.

    There are emergency extension powers allowing the Governor-General to extend the Act for up to 12 months by proclamation if unforeseen delays, sudden economic deterioration, or genuine emergencies prevent orderly review. But even an emergency extension requires Parliament to vote before it expires. If Parliament still fails to act, the Act automatically sunsets with wind-down provisions.

  52. Working-draft proposal: preserve accrued rights/liabilities and proceedings after sunset, with seven-year record retention and State referral reversion.

    Post-sunset, certain obligations survive: State referrals of power automatically revert, Slot obligations continue for the 24-month period, accrued rights and liabilities remain enforceable, pending proceedings can be completed, and records must be retained for 7 years.

  53. Working-draft proposal: give Transition-Date workers civil retrospective protection if substantially displaced by actual/anticipated AI before Royal Assent and still lacking equivalent work; lodge supported claims within ninety days.

    Eligibility requires that the worker was employed on the Transition Date, was displaced between the Transition Date and Royal Assent, the displacement was wholly or substantially due to AI implementation (or anticipated implementation, or restructuring in anticipation of AI), and the worker has not yet secured equivalent alternative employment. The claims process requires workers to lodge a claim with the Enterprise within 90 days of Royal Assent, supported by evidence of employment on the Transition Date, evidence of displacement, and evidence connecting the displacement to AI.

  54. Working-draft proposal: allow retrospective claimants reinstatement with back-pay or discounted lump-sum earnings loss to initial sunset, less actual/reasonably available earnings, with fresh Tribunal appeal within thirty days.

    Remedies give workers a choice. They can elect reinstatement to their Protected Employment Slot with full back pay and all entitlements as if they had never been displaced. Alternatively, they can elect a lump-sum payment equal to the difference between what they would have earned under a Protected Slot from displacement to the Initial Sunset Date and what they actually earned (or could reasonably have earned), discounted to present value. This lump-sum option recognises that some workers may have moved on and prefer a financial settlement to returning. Appeals go to the Tribunal within 30 days, heard de novo,

  55. Working-draft proposal: void dominant-purpose avoidance; prohibit fragmentation, related transfers, sham termination/rehiring, affiliate outsourcing and engineered failure; impose predecessor obligations on phoenix successors and personal liability on arrangers.

    The draft adopts the architecture of Australian income tax anti avoidance law (Part XIV). A general rule voids any arrangement entered into with the dominant purpose of avoiding, reducing or deferring obligations, applying the objective factors familiar from Part IVA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936. Specific provisions address fragmentation, transfers to related entities, sham terminations and rehiring through intermediaries, outsourcing to affiliates, and engineered business failure. Phoenix provisions impose the predecessor's obligations on the successor and personal liability on those who arranged it.

  56. Working-draft proposal: exclude knowingly or recklessly false, malicious, improper-recipient or unlawfully obtained whistleblowing; protect reasonable non-criminal breaches where serious wrongdoing and overriding public interest justify disclosure.

    189 Protections do not apply if: 189.1 the disclosure is false and the whistleblower knew it was false or was reckless about its truth; 189.2 the disclosure was made maliciously or for improper purposes (personal gain, revenge, harassment); 189.3 the disclosure was not made to an appropriate recipient; or 189.4 the whistleblower obtained the information through unlawful conduct. 190 Even if information was obtained through breach of contract or other non- criminal conduct, protections apply if: 190.1 the public interest in disclosure outweighs the breach; 190.2 the disclosure reveals serious wrongdoing; and 190.3 the whistleblower acted reasonably.

  57. Working-draft proposal: for Australian providers using resident workers, retain normal slot duties without withholding; for non-resident work require client withholding at category-standard rates, allowing clients to treat all work as non-resident absent a split statement.

    Scenario One. Where a provider that is not a Foreign Provider uses Resident Workers, standard Protected Employment Slot obligations apply. No withholding obligation arises under Part XV. The normal system works.  Scenario Two. When a provider that is not a Foreign Provider employs some or all non-resident workers, the Australian Client must withhold an amount at the Standard Withholding Rate (section 262) from the payment for the part of the service attributable to non-resident workers. The provider must supply a statement showing the split between resident and non-resident work (section 213). If no such statement is provided, the client may treat the entire service as performed by non-residents (section 214).

  58. Working-draft proposal: require 30% client withholding on all payments to unregistered foreign providers, irrespective of worker location.

    Scenario Three. When the provider is an Unregistered Foreign Provider, the Australian Client must withhold at the Penalty Withholding Rate of 30% from the entire payment (section 264), regardless of where the workers are based or any statement provided by the provider (section 221). This approach is intentionally strict; it strongly encourages foreign providers to register.

  59. Working-draft proposal: use a 15% default calculated withholding rate until published category-specific rates supersede it.

    Until the Authority publishes its first calculated rate, a default Calculated Withholding Rate of 15% applies (section 297). This default is a flat rate and does not distinguish between Advisory Professions and Other Professional Services. Once the Authority completes its first actuarial assessment and publishes category-specific rates, the default is superseded.

  60. Working-draft proposal: require registered foreign providers to maintain insurance, Australian agent/account, withholding, quarterly returns, audit cooperation and seven-year records, with change notifications within 21 days.

    Registered Foreign Providers carry significant ongoing obligations, including: • notification to the Authority within 21 days of any change to registration information; • maintaining professional indemnity insurance at the required level; • maintaining an Australian service agent and bank account; • compliance with all withholding obligations; • submission of quarterly returns in the prescribed form; • permitting Authority audits of records relating to payments received, work allocation between resident and non-resident workers, and amounts withheld and remitted; • retention of records for at least 7 years;

  61. Working-draft proposal: establish a separately accounted advisory-professions fund for benefits, retraining and administration capped at 5%, audited by the Auditor-General with statements published within six months.

    The Advisory Professions Protected Employment Fund receives all withheld and remitted amounts, penalties recovered under the Part, interest earned on the Fund, and any other amounts credited to it. It pays benefits to Protected Slot holders in the advisory sector, funds retraining programs for displaced Advisory Profession workers, and covers the Authority’s administration costs in administering the Part, capped at 5% of annual Fund receipts. The Fund must be maintained separately from other Authority funds, audited annually by the Auditor-General, and the audited financial statements must be published on the Authority's website within 6 months of each financial year end.

  62. Working-draft proposal: apply a targeted import charge to employers displacing Transition-Date Australian workers through AI and importing the same/substantially similar goods, at attributable-slot-cost/import-revenue rates.

    A Covered Importer is defined precisely. It must be an enterprise that employed workers in Australia on the Transition Date, displaced one or more of those workers by reason of AI implementation, and now imports goods that are the same as or substantially similar to goods previously produced by those displaced workers. The IEIC Rate is calculated individually for each Covered Importer using the formula: IEIC Rate = Attributable Slot Costs ÷ Revenue from Imported Goods × 100

  63. Working-draft proposal: cap targeted import-charge rates at 25%; default to 25% if revenue is zero/unreliable or attributable-slot records inadequate, unless the Authority approves less.

    317 The IEIC Rate for a Covered Importer cannot exceed 25%. 318 If: 318.1 a Covered Importer's Revenue from Imported Goods is zero or cannotbe reliably determined; or 318.2 the Covered Importer fails to maintain.records sufficient to calculate Attributable Slot Costs, then the IEIC Rate is 25% unless the Authority approves a lower rate.

  64. Working-draft proposal: reconcile targeted import charges annually against attributable workers’ slot costs.

    359 Atthe end of each financial year, the Authority must reconcile: 359.1 the total IEIC paid by the Covered Importer during the year against 359.2 the total Protected Employment Slot costs payable by the Covered Importer for Attributable Workers during the year.

  65. Working-draft proposal: exclude certified-country, targeted-charge, government/diplomatic, regulated low-value and other exempt goods from general import charges.

    The exclusions are important. No EIC applies to goods from Certified Countries, goods already subject to IEIC under Part XVI (no double charging), government imports, diplomatic imports, goods below a prescribed minimum Customs Value threshold, and goods prescribed by regulation as exempt.

  66. Working-draft proposal: recognise equivalent foreign protections with 70% prior earnings for five years, retraining, meaningful penalties and 80% workforce coverage, allowing substantially equivalent alternative designs.

    Certification requires that a country's laws provide: protection against sudden income loss for AI-displaced workers; income support of at least 70% of prior earnings for at least 5 years; access to retraining and transition assistance; enforcement mechanisms with meaningful penalties; and coverage of at least 80% of the workforce. The system doesn't require other countries to copy the Act. It recognises that different designs can achieve equivalent protection.

  67. Working-draft proposal: credit recognised foreign displacement charges against general import liability up to the domestic charge otherwise payable.

    The credit for Foreign Charges prevents double-charging. If a country isn't certified but imposes its own charge or levy to fund worker-displacement protections, importers can claim a credit against EIC liability for the charges actually paid, up to the amount of EIC that would otherwise be payable.

  68. Working-draft proposal: review the general import charge within two years, including neutrality, trade, certification, credits, trade obligations and administration; table the report within fifteen sitting days.

    511 The Minister must cause a review of the operation of this Part to be conducted within 2 years after the EIC Commencement Date. 512 The review must consider: 512.1 512.2 512.3 512.4 512.5 512.6 pH-7, the effectiveness of EIC in maintaining competitive neutrality for Australian producers; theampact of EIC on import volumes, prices, and trade patterns; the operation of the country certification system; the take-up of credits for Foreign Charges; consistency with Australia's international trade obligations; administrative burden and efficiency of processes; and any recommendations for amendments 513 The Minister must cause a copy of the review report to be tabled in each House of Parliament within 15 sitting days of receiving the report.

  69. Working-draft proposal: provide just-terms Commonwealth compensation where property is acquired, with Federal Court determination of disputed amounts.

    634 Ifthe operation of this Act would result in an acquisition of property from a person otherwise than on just terms, the Commonwealth is liable to pay reasonable compensation to the person. 635 If the Commonwealth and the person do not agree on the amount of compensation, the person may institute proceedings in the Federal Court for recovery of compensation.

  70. Working-draft proposal: establish an Employment Continuity Authority for registration, monitoring, index calculation, collection, funds, benefits, enforcement and research.

    An Employment Continuity Authority administers the scheme (Part XIX). It is a substantial body, combining functions that ordinarily sit across several agencies: registration, monitoring, calculation of the displacement index, revenue collection, fund management, benefits distribution, enforcement and research.

  71. Working-draft proposal: establish an Employment Continuity Tribunal led by a Federal Court judge, with legally qualified deputies having at least five years’ experience.

    578 The Employment Continuity Tribunal is established by this Act. 579 The Tribunal consists of: 579.1 a President, who must be a Judge of the Federal Court; 579.2 Deputy Presidents, who must be legally qualified and have at least 5 years of experience; 579.3 such other members as appointed by the Governor-General.

  72. Working-draft proposal: restrict additional prescribed AI-assessment matters to objective fact criteria, excluding credibility and novel/contested legal interpretation, where assessment reduces cost/delay.

    645 A Prescribed Matter is a question arising under this Act or the regulations that is eitheridentified as a Prescribed Matter by a provision of this Act or prescribed by the Minister under the following section. A question is not a Prescribed Matter unless one of those applies. 646 The Minister may, by legislative instrument, prescribe classes of question as Prescribed Matters, but only if satisfied that: 646.1 the question involves the application of objective criteria to facts; 646.2 the question does not require assessment of witness credibility; 646.3 the question does not involve novel or contested questions of legal interpretation; and 646.4 an AI Assessment would reduce cost and delay for the parties.

  73. Working-draft proposal: keep AI assessments non-binding, without legal effect or enforceability.

    651 An assessment of the AI Assessor: 651.1 651.2 651.3 is not binding on any party; does not create, extinguish, or otherwise affect any right, entitlement, liability, or obligation; and is not enforceable, and is not a decision for the purposes of this Act or of any other law of the Commonwealth.

  74. Working-draft proposal: treat AI assessments as agreements only upon every party’s acceptance within 28 days; require prior worker information and an offer of Authority assistance.

    653 Where every party to a Prescribed Matter notifies the Authority, in the approved form and within 28 days of the assessment, that the party accepts the assessment, the assessment takes effect as an agreement between those parties on the terms of the assessment, and is enforceable as such. 654 An acceptance given by a Worker under the preceding section is of no effect unless, before giving it, the Worker has been informed of the matters required to appear on the face of an assessment and has been offered assistance by the Authority under Part XIX.

  75. Working-draft proposal: allow fresh Tribunal applications regardless of AI assessment, normally within ninety days; give AI assessments no presumptive weight.

    655 A party toa Prescribed Matter may apply to the Tribunal for a determination of the matter, whether or not an assessment has been made. 656 An application must be lodged within 90 days of the assessment, or within such longer period as the Tribunal allows. 657 The Tribunal determines the matter afresh, and: 657.1 is not bound by, and must not give any presumptive weight to, an assessment; 657.2 may receive any evidence; and 657.3 may make any determination open to it under this Act.

  76. Working-draft proposal: monitor AI-assessment accuracy, consistency and timeliness, learn from differing Tribunal decisions, update systems and report annually.

    664 The Authority must: 664.1 monitor the performance of the AI Assessor, including accuracy, consistency, and timeliness; 664.2 review assessments that differ materially from a subsequent determination of the Tribunal, to identify systemic issues; 664.3 update the AI Assessor's systems as necessary to improve performance; and 664.4 report annually to the Minister on the operation of the AI Assessor.

  77. Working-draft proposal: provide monitoring powers over records, AI equipment and premises, with residential entry requiring consent or warrant.

    594 For purposes of monitoring compliance with this Act, an inspector may: 594.1 enter premises during reasonable hours; 594.2 inspect documents and records; 594.3 inspect AI Systems and equipment; 594.4 interview employees; 594.5 take photographs, videos, or make recordings; 594.6 take samples or make copies of documents; 594.7 use equipment on premises; 594.8 take any action reasonably necessary for monitoring purposes. 595 An inspector must not enter residential premises without consent or a warrant.

  78. Working-draft proposal: require seven-year English-language records accessible from Australia within fourteen days.

    the Part imposes record-keeping obligations requiring Enterprises to maintain complete and accurate records in English for at least seven years, accessible from Australia within 14 days of a request.

  79. Working-draft proposal: complete automated internal review within fourteen days, allowing only wholly favourable changes or referral to human review.

    710 The automated review must: 710.1 consider the application and any supporting material; 710.2 apply the relevant provisions of this Act to the facts as disclosed by the available information; 710.3 be completed within 14 days of the application being made; and 710.4 result in one of the following outcomes, and no other: 710.4.1 the original decision isvaried, or set aside and a new decision substituted, in terms wholly more favourable to the applicant than the original decision; or 710.4.2 the matter is referred for human review under Tier 2 - Human Review.

  80. Working-draft proposal: use a qualified human reviewer of at least equivalent seniority, independent of the original decision and automated review.

    720 Human review must be conducted by an officer of the Authority who: 720.1 was not involved in making the original decision; 720.2 was not directly involved in the automated review; 720.3 holds a position at least equivalent to that of the original decision- maker; and 720.4 has the qualifications, training, or experience prescribed by the regulations.

  81. Working-draft proposal: require independent reviews within five years of commencement and at least every five years thereafter.

    621 The Minister must cause an independent review of the operation of this Act to be conducted: 621.1 within 5 years after commencement; and 621.2 at intervals of not more than 5 years thereafter.

  82. Working-draft proposal: use rebuttable AI/non-AI classification schedules, with unlisted technologies assessed without presumption.

    5.1.9. Technologies that are listed in Schedule 1A are presumed to be AI Systems.An Enterprise deploying such technology bears the legal burden of proving, on the balance of probabilities, that its specific implementation does not meet the definition. 5.1.10. Technologies that are listed in Schedule 1B are presumed not to be AI Systems. The ECA or a Worker alleging such technology qualifies as an AI System bears the burden of proving it meets the definition in this section. 5.1.11. Technologies not listed in either Schedule are assessed without presumption.

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  83. Working-draft proposal: retain genuine independent-business exemptions from deemed employment.

    Section 6.4 provides exemptions adapted from the ITAA Division 87 tests but modified to suit employment protection rather than tax purposes. These exemptions recognise that some individuals genuinely operate independent businesses through corporate structures, and applying attribution rules to them would be inappropriate and unfair.

  84. Working-draft proposal: when deemed employment applies, make ultimate recipients and interposed entities jointly and severally responsible for Act obligations.

    Section 6.5 states that when deemed employment applies, the Ultimate Recipient and Interposed Entity are jointly and severally responsible for all Act obligations. This serves various enforcement purposes.

  85. Working-draft proposal: use ABS All Groups CPI, adjust annually on the Transition-Date anniversary or ECA-set date, and prohibit downward pay adjustment on negative CPI.

    The mechanics are defined precisely: CPI means the All Groups CPI published by the ABS, adjustments are made annually on the Transition Date anniversary (or a date the ECA sets), and critically, if CPI goes negative, no reduction is made — it's a floor, not a two-way adjustment.

  86. Working-draft proposal: exclude profit-maximisation, AI efficiency, competitive/shareholder pressure and profitable efficiency restructuring from grounds for eliminating slots.

    Crucially, the Part specifies what does not satisfy the test: wanting to maximise profits by capturing AI gains, being able to maintain output with fewer workers, competitive pressure to match AI-adopting rivals, shareholder pressure to cut labour costs, or restructuring for efficiency while remaining profitable. The fact that an action is commercially rational does not preclude a finding that its dominant purpose is to avoid obligations under the Act.

  87. Working-draft proposal: retain the $200 weekly income exemption with the 25% alternative-income offset.

    In this Phase, alternative income offsets are calculated at 25% rather than dollar-for-dollar (except the $200 weekly exemption still applies).

  88. Working-draft proposal: maintain slot remuneration and do not require disputed alternative work pending resolution.

    However, if the worker refuses, they continue receiving Protected Slot remuneration while the appropriateness of the offer is disputed under Part XXI. They're not required to commence the disputed work pending determination.

  89. Working-draft proposal: calculate living wages using median household expenditure, essential costs, regional variations, family composition and international adequacy standards.

    116 The Living Wage is calculated with reference to: 116.1 median household expenditure data; 116.2 essential cost categories (housing, food, utilities, transport, healthcare); 116.3 regional variations in the cost of living; 116.4 family composition (single/ individuals, couples, households with dependents); and 116.5 international standards for adequate minimum income.

  90. Working-draft proposal: pay living wages fortnightly by direct deposit, subject only to income testing, as an entitlement rather than discretionary assistance.

    117 The Living Wage is paid: 117.1 fortnightly by direct deposit; 117.2 subject only to income testing; and 117.3 as an entitlement, not as discretionary assistance.

  91. Working-draft proposal: set living wages generally below slot benefits and above unemployment benefits, with annual indexation and regulated family variation.

    118 The Living Wage amount will typically be: 118.1 less than typical Protected Employment Slot benefits (encouraging employment over Living Wage where possible); 118.2 more than traditional unemployment benefits (recognising this is not temporary unemployment but potentially an extended inability to secure traditional employment); 118.3 indexed annually to maintain purchasing power; and 118.4 varied by family composition if regulations so provide.

  92. Working-draft proposal: avoid arbitrary living-wage duration limits during the scheme and allow immediate re-entry after short-term work ends.

    There's also "in and out" flexibility. If a recipient gets short-term work that ends, they re-enter the Living Wage immediately with no waiting period, recognising that AI-affected labour markets may only offer intermittent opportunities.

  93. Working-draft proposal: require parliamentary debate within six months, public hearings and completion of sunset/extension decisions by end-2034.

    Parliament must then debate the report within 6 months, hold public hearings, vote on whether to extend, modify, or allow sunset, and complete the legislative process by 31 December 2034, two full years before the sunset date. This ensures certainty for Enterprises and workers well ahead of the deadline.

  94. Working-draft proposal: exclude retrospective criminal penalties and punitive sanctions while conferring retrospective worker rights and remedies.

    155 It: 155.1 155.2 155.3 155.4 155.5 155.6 confers rights and remedies on Workers; does not impose criminal penalties or punitive sanctions; addresses unfair displacement occurring during the legislative process; prevents a "displacement race" where announcing the Act accelerates job losses; ensures Workers displaced immediately before and after Royal Assent receive equivalent protection; and operates for the limited period between the Transition Date (31 December 2026) and Royal Assent (anticipated early 2027).

  95. Working-draft proposal: protect qualifying whistleblowers from detrimental action, with compensation, reinstatement and civil penalties.

    Enterprises are prohibited from taking detrimental action against whistleblowers (dismissal, demotion, harassment, discrimination, reputational damage, career damage, financial loss, or any other adverse treatment). Any detrimental action is void. Remedies include compensation, reinstatement, and substantial civil penalties: 200 penalty units for individuals, 2,000 for corporations.

  96. Working-draft proposal: protect whistleblower identity, provide secure reporting channels, redact identifiers and penalise unauthorised identity disclosure.

    188 A whistleblower's identity must be protected unless they consent to disclosure; 188.1 the ECA must establish secure channels for confidential disclosures; 188.2 information that could identify the whistleblower must be redacted in published materials; 188.3 unauthorized disclosure of whistleblower identity is an offence (100 penalty units).

  97. Working-draft proposal: for registered foreign providers, withhold from resident workers at standard rates and remit to the Authority; clients need not withhold on entirely resident work.

    Scenario Four. Where the provider is a Registered Foreign Provider using some or all Resident Workers, and some or all non-Resident Workers, the provider must withhold from payments to each Resident Worker at the Standard Withholding Rate (section 221A) and remit the withheld amounts to the Authority. If the payment is entirely for work performed by Resident Workers, the Australian Client is not responsible for any withholding obligations (section 220).

  98. Working-draft proposal: for registered providers using non-resident workers, clients withhold on that portion, including the full payment if all work is non-resident.

    221 If the Registered Foreign Provider uses both Resident Workers and non- resident Workers: 221.1 section 219 applies in respect of the Resident Workers; and 221.2 section 211 (Scenario Two) applies in respect of the non-resident Workers. 221A. If the Registered Foreign Provider uses only non-resident Workers, the Australian Client must withhold from the entire Professional Services Payment an amount calculated in accordance with section 261 (Standard Withholding Rate), as if Scenario Two applied.

  99. Working-draft proposal: set separate professional-service withholding rates using compensation, displacement timeline, profit margins and delivery volume/value.

    256 The Authority must prescribe separate withholding rates for each category, having regard to: 256.1 the average compensation levels of Workers in that category; 256.2 the expected timeline for AI-driven displacement in that category; 256.3 the typical profit margin structures of Enterprises in that category; 256.4 the volume and value characteristics of service delivery in that category.

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  100. Working-draft proposal: calculate service-category rates actuarially using protected-slot costs, projected payments and the displacement-index phase; review at least annually.

    In determining this rate, the Authority must have regard to the actuarial assessment of Protected Slot costs, projected payment volumes, the current Labour Market Displacement Index phase, and such other matters as the Authority considers relevant (section 259). The Authority must review the Calculated Withholding Rate at least annually (section 260).

  101. Working-draft proposal: for imported goods used internally rather than sold, use arm’s-length value as import revenue.

    314 Where IEIC Goods are used by the Covered Importer in its own operations and are not sold to third parties, the Revenue from Imported Goods is taken to be the arm's length value of those goods.

  102. Working-draft proposal: prevent double payment through targeted import charges and direct slot obligations.

    362 For the avoidance of doubt, a Covered Importer is not required to pay twice for the same Protected Employment Slot obligation—once through IEIC and again through direct Slot payments.

  103. Working-draft proposal: commence general import charges on 1 July 2028 or a later regulated date.

    433 This Part applies to goods imported into Australia on or after the EIC Commencement Date. 434 The EIC Commencement Date is 1 July 2028, or such later date as prescribed by the regulations.

  104. Working-draft proposal: determine industry-sector general import rates from average Australian slot burdens, review annually and publish rates, methodology and effective dates.

    The EIC Rate is not enterprise-specific (that's Part XVI's job). Instead, the Authority determines a rate for each Industry Sector representing the average burden of Protected Slot costs borne by Australian enterprises in that sector, expressed as a percentage of revenue. The rate is calculated from a statistically valid sample of enterprises in the sector, reviewed and revised annually, with methodology published transparently.

  105. Working-draft proposal: review targeted import charges within two years, covering effectiveness, trade, compliance, avoidance, importer impacts, trade obligations and administration.

    421 The Minister must cause a review of the operation of this Part to be conducted within 2 years after the IEIC Commencement Date. 422 The review must consider: 422.1 the effectiveness of IEIC in preventing offshore relocation to avoid Protected Slot costs; 422.2 the impact of IEIC on import volumes, prices, and trade patterns; 422.3 compliance levels and enforcement effectiveness; 422.4 incidence of avoidance schemes and adequacy of anti-avoidance provisions; 422.5 impact on Covered Importers and their business operations; 422.6 consistency with Australia's international trade obligations; 422.7 administrative burden and efficiency of processes; and 422.8 any recommendations for amendment.

  106. Working-draft proposal: review professional-services withholding within three years and table the report within fifteen sitting days.

    299 The Minister must cause a review of the operation of this Part to be conducted within 3 years after commencement. 300 The review must consider: 300.1 300.2 300.3 300.4 300.5 300.6 300.7 300.8 the effectiveness of the)four-scenario framework in preventing offshore avoidance; the appropriateness of withholding rates; compliance levels and enforcement effectiveness; impact on the Advisory Professions employment market; impact on availability and cost of Advisory Profession services consistency with international trade obligations; administrative burden on Clients and Advisory Service Providers; and any recommendations for amendment. 301 The Minister must cause a copy of the review report to be tabled in each House of Parliament within 15 sitting days of receiving the report.

  107. Working-draft proposal: keep import-charge funds separate, audit annual statements and cap administration at 5% of receipts.

    The EIC Fund is separate from the IEIC Fund. It feeds into the National Employment Continuity Fund and funds retraining programs, reflecting its broader, non-enterprise-specific purpose. Unlike the IEIC Fund, which pays benefits directly to Attributable Workers of specific Covered Importers, the EIC Fund supports the system generally. Administration costs are capped at 5%.

  108. Working-draft proposal: enforce Tribunal determinations only through the Federal Court or Federal Circuit and Family Court, on party/Authority application.

    584 The Tribunal does not have power to enforce its own determinations. 585 A determination of the Tribunal may be enforced only by the Federal Court, or the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia, on the application of a party or of the Authority; and in any such proceeding the determination is evidence of the matters determined.

  109. Working-draft proposal: allow Federal Court appeals from Tribunal decisions on questions of law within 28 days, with extensions for special circumstances.

    591 A party to a proceeding before the Tribunal may appeal to the Federal Court, on a question of law, from a decision of the Tribunal. 592 An appeal must be filed within 28 days of the Tribunal's decision. 593 The Federal Court may extend time for appealing if satisfied there are special circumstances.

  110. Working-draft proposal: require plain notices of non-binding assessments, Tribunal access and protection from worker cost orders except vexatious/bad-faith applications.

    652 An assessment must state prominently, and in plain language, that: 652.1 652.2 652.3 the assessment is not binding, and the party is free to disregard it; the party may apply to the Tribunal for a determination of the matter; and in the case of a Worker, no order for costs may be made against the Worker in any such application unless the Tribunal is satisfied the application was vexatious or made in bad faith.

  111. Working-draft proposal: apply enterprise indemnity costs after unsuccessful post-assessment challenges, subject to Tribunal discretion for reasonably arguable cases; protect workers from costs absent vexatiousness/bad faith.

    658 Where an Enterprise applies to the Tribunal following an assessment, and the Tribunal's determination is not more favourable to the Enterprise than the assessment, the Enterprise must pay the other party's costs of the proceeding on an indemnity basis. 659 The Tribunal may order otherwise if satisfied that the Enterprise's case was reasonably arguable. 660 No order for costs may be made against a Worker in a proceeding under this Division, unless the Tribunal is satisfied that the Worker's application was vexatious or was made in bad faith.

  112. Working-draft proposal: require procedural fairness in AI assessment, including hearing opportunities, adverse-material disclosure, impartiality and reasons; provide fresh assessment on request after failure.

    665 The AI Assessor and the Authority must comply with the rules of procedural fairness, including: 665.1 providing parties with a reasonable opportunity to be heard; 665.2 disclosing adverse material to affected parties; 665.3 avoiding actual or apprehended bias; and 665.4 providing adequate reasons for decisions. 666 A failure to comply with the preceding section does not affect the validity of any act or decision, but the Authority must, on the request of any party, cause a fresh assessment to be made.

  113. Working-draft proposal: allow investigation notices on reasonable grounds, with at least fourteen days to comply and Part XXIV privilege/self-incrimination limits.

    600 If the Authority believes on reasonable grounds that a person has information relevant to an investigation of suspected non-compliance, the Authority may, by notice, require the person to: 600.1 provide information; 600.2 produce documents; 600.3 attend for examination; or 600.4 otherwise assist the investigation. 601 A notice must specify a reasonable time for compliance, being not less than 14 days. 602 A person must comply with a notice. The civil penalty for failing to do so 1,000 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 603 The provisions of Part XXIV relating to self-incrimination and legal professional privilege apply to a notice under this Division, and this Division does not confer any wider protection.

  114. Working-draft proposal: prohibit automated affirmation/adverse changes and automatically refer all other outcomes for human review without applicant action.

    711 An automated review must not affirm the original decision, and must not vary a decision otherwise than wholly in favour of the applicant. 712 Where an automated review does not result in an outcome wholly more favourable to the applicant, the Authority must refer the matter for human review, and the applicant is not required to take any step to obtain that referral.

  115. Working-draft proposal: test automated review for accuracy/consistency, ensure human oversight, prevent bias/discrimination and update systems for legal/policy changes.

    716»The Authority must ensure that the AI System used for automatedjreview: 716.1 is regularly tested for accuracy and consistency; 716.2 is subject to human oversight; 716.3 does not produce decisions that are biased or discriminatory; and 716.4 is updated to reflect changes in the law and Authority policy.

  116. Working-draft proposal: determine human reviews afresh within sixty days and give written reasons; permit the reviewer to make necessary enquiries and invite submissions.

    721 The officer conducting human review: 721.1 must consider the application afresh, without being bound by the original decision or the automated review; 721.2 may make any enquiries the officer considers necessary; 721.3 may invite the applicant to make oral or written submissions; 7214 must make a decision within 60 days of the request for human review; and 721.5 must give the applicant written reasons for the decision.

  117. Working-draft proposal: provide free automated/Tribunal review, hardship/exempt-class waivers of human-review fees and fee refunds for substantially successful human reviews.

    733 No fee is payable for an application for automated review. 734 An application for human review must be accompanied by the administrative fee prescribed by the regulations, unless: 734.1 the applicant satisfies the Authority that payment of the fee would cause financial hardship; or 734.2 the application falls within a class of applications exempted by the regulations. 735 Ifthe applicant is wholly or substantially successful on human review: 735.1 the administrative fee paid must be refunded; and 735.2 the Authority may, in its discretion, reimburse the applicant for reasonable costs incurred in preparing the application. 736 no fee is payable for an application to the Employment Continuity Tribunal for review, but:

  118. Working-draft proposal: credit excess targeted import charges against future liability or refund within 28 days of written request; recover shortfalls from importers.

    360 Ifthe IEIC paid exceeds the Protected Employment Slot costs payable: 360.1 the excess is credited to the Covered mporter's account withthe Authority; and 360.2 the credit may be applied against future IEIC liability or, at the Covered Importer's election, refunded within 28 days of a written request. 361 Ifthe Protected Employment Slot costs payable exceed the IEIC paid: 361.1 the shortfall remains payable by the Covered Importer; and 361.2 the Authority may recover the shortfall as a debt due to the Commonwealth.

  119. Working-draft proposal: table the targeted import-charge review report within fifteen sitting days of receipt.

    423 The Minister must cause a copy of the review report to be tabled in each House of Parliament within 15 sitting days of receiving the report.

  120. In developing the working draft, require enterprises experiencing sustained business growth to create additional protected slots at regulated growth thresholds.

    32. An Enterprise experiencing sustained business growth must create additional Protected Employment Slots in accordance with this Part. 33. New Protected Employment Slots must be created when the Enterprise meets or exceeds the growth thresholds specified by regulation.

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