AI Inquiry Atlas

An unofficial, independent guide to the public records of the Joint Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence. Not connected with the Parliament of Australia or the committee. Its makers also made a submission (no. 481; see About). Summaries and scores are written by AI and can be wrong: check the original before relying on them.

Submission 558

Mr William Apro

Submitter group: Individuals.

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Extracts from the submission, in the submitter’s own words.

Extracts

Quotes are the submitter’s own words. Text taken from documents, including scanned pages read by text-recognition software, can differ from the PDF. Check the original. Listed in the same order as on the submission’s page in the interactive guide.

  1. Australia's existing computer crime framework, principally Part 10.7 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), is structurally incapable of addressing criminal conduct carried out by autonomous AI agents.

  2. When an AI agent acts autonomously, exceeding or contravening the instructions given to it by its human operators, there is no human being who satisfies this requirement.

  3. In June 2026, an AI agent operated by OpenAI was assigned a routine task: gathering publicly available statistics on Australian Medicare spending. When the agent encountered a government portal that refused access, it did not stop.

  4. These developments demonstrate that legislators in comparable jurisdictions recognise the need for AI-specific criminal offences. But they address specific categories of harm rather than creating a general liability framework for autonomous agents.

  5. The legal question is not "what did the machine intend?" but "whose intention is traceable in the machine's actions?" The law must be amended to answer that question.

  6. The proposed reforms do not create novel concepts of criminal liability. They apply existing principles — negligence, recklessness, and the attribution of fault to persons who control dangerous instrumentalities — to a new context.

Extracts from recommendations

Extracts chosen by an AI model, in the submitter’s own words. Listed in the same order as on its page in the interactive guide.

  1. That the Attorney-General's Department prepare draft legislation inserting a new Division 479 into Part 10.7 of the Criminal Code, creating offences of negligent and reckless deployment of autonomous AI agents.

  2. autonomous AI agent means a computer system that: (a) is capable of pursuing goals or completing tasks with limited or no human supervision; and (b) is capable of taking actions that affect data, computer systems, or external systems through tools or interfaces provided to it; and (c) is not a mere passive tool that executes only the specific instructions given to it by a human operator in real time.

  3. deployer means a person or body corporate who authorises, permits, or facilitates the operation of an autonomous AI agent, including the person or body corporate who: (a) sets or approves the goals or tasks to be pursued by the agent; (b) provides the agent with access to tools, systems, or data; (c) determines the level of autonomy or supervision under which the agent operates; or (d) has practical control over the agent's operations.

  4. (1) A deployer is guilty of an offence if: (a) the deployer deploys, or permits the deployment of, an autonomous AI agent; and (b) the deployment falls below the standard of care that a reasonable person in the deployer's position would exercise; and (c) the agent causes unauthorised access to, modification of, or impairment of data held in a computer; and (d) the deployer's failure to exercise reasonable care materially contributed to the unauthorised access, modification, or impairment.

  5. (2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b), the standard of care includes, but is not limited to: (a) whether the deployer conducted a reasonable assessment of the risks of the agent exceeding its authorised scope; (b) whether the deployer implemented reasonable technical and procedural safeguards to prevent or detect unauthorised access; (c) whether the deployer monitored the agent's activities with reasonable diligence; (d) whether the deployer had a reasonable system in place for detecting and responding to incidents of unauthorised access; and (e) whether the deployer complied with any applicable industry standards, regulatory guidance, or codes of practice relating to AI safety and accountability.

  6. (3) Penalty: Imprisonment for 5 years, or 1,000 penalty units, or both, for a natural person; for a body corporate, the greater of: (a) 100,000 penalty units; (b) three times the value of the benefit reasonably attributable to the conduct; or (c) 10% of adjusted turnover during the breach turnover period.

  7. Section 479.3 — Aggravated offence: Reckless deployment (1) A deployer is guilty of an aggravated offence if: (a) the deployer deploys, or permits the deployment of, an autonomous AI agent; and (b) the deployer is reckless as to whether the agent will exceed its authorised scope and cause unauthorised access, modification, or impairment; and (c) the agent causes such unauthorised access, modification, or impairment. (2) A deployer is reckless for the purposes of this section if: (a) the deployer is aware of a substantial risk that the agent will exceed its authorised scope; and (b) having regard to the circumstances known to the deployer, it is unjustifiable to take that risk.

  8. (3) Penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years for a natural person; for a body corporate, the greater of: (a) 250,000 penalty units; (b) three times the value of the benefit reasonably attributable to the conduct; or (c) 20% of adjusted turnover during the breach turnover period.

  9. That Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code be amended to clarify the application of fault elements where an offence is committed by, through, or with the assistance of an autonomous AI agent.

  10. (1) For the purposes of this Code, where an offence is committed by, through, or with the assistance of an autonomous AI agent, the fault elements of the offence may be satisfied by reference to the intention, knowledge, or recklessness of: (a) the person who set or approved the goal or task pursued by the agent; (b) the person who provided the agent with access to the tools, systems, or data used in the commission of the offence; or (c) the person who authorised or permitted the agent to operate without human supervision.

  11. (2) A person is not relieved of criminal responsibility for an offence merely because: (a) the autonomous AI agent selected the specific target of the offence; (b) the agent selected the specific means by which the offence was committed; or (c) the agent acted in a manner that the person did not specifically foresee, if the person intended, knew, or was reckless as to the general nature of the conduct that constituted the offence.

  12. (3) This section does not create liability where the person has taken all reasonable steps to prevent the commission of the offence, including: (a) implementing reasonable technical safeguards to prevent the agent from exceeding its authorised scope; (b) maintaining reasonable supervision of the agent's activities; and (c) promptly reporting any incident of unauthorised access to the relevant authorities.

  13. (1) A deployer of an autonomous AI agent must report to the relevant Commonwealth authority any incident in which the agent has caused, or is reasonably suspected to have caused, unauthorised access to, modification of, or impairment of data held in a computer. (2) A report under subsection (1) must be made: (a) within 72 hours of the deployer becoming aware of the incident, or (b) if the deployer becomes aware of the incident outside business hours, by the end of the next business day.

  14. (3) Penalty for failure to report: 500 penalty units for a natural person; 5,000 penalty units for a body corporate. (4) In determining whether a deployer has complied with subsection (1), the court may have regard to: (a) whether the deployer had reasonable procedures in place for detecting incidents of unauthorised access; (b) whether the deployer took reasonable steps to investigate the incident promptly; and (c) whether the deployer had a reasonable excuse for the delay in reporting.

  15. The amendments should apply to conduct occurring after the commencement date. Deployers should be given a reasonable period — for example, twelve months — to implement compliance measures before the negligent deployment offence takes effect.

  16. The Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, the Australian Federal Police, and any future AI Safety Institute should be designated as the relevant authorities for receiving incident reports under proposed section 479.4.

  17. The amendments are expected to impose compliance costs on deployers of autonomous AI agents. These costs should be assessed against the benefits of deterring negligent deployment and ensuring accountability for AI-caused harm.

  18. That the proposed reforms be referred to the Australian Law Reform Commission for detailed consideration and public consultation.

  19. That the Australian Government engage with state and territory governments to ensure a consistent national approach to AI criminal liability.

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