AI Inquiry Atlas

An unofficial, independent guide to the public records of the Joint Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence. Not connected with the Parliament of Australia or the committee. Its makers also made a submission (no. 481; see About). Summaries and scores are written by AI and can be wrong: check the original before relying on them.

Submission 63

HALIXIS

Submitter group: Companies.

An AI model identified the submitter group and wrote the summary, key points and recommendation summaries. Counts do not measure importance or merit.

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Summary

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Argues that regulatory coverage and organisations’ ability to operationalise AI governance are distinct questions. Recommends better evidence, safeguarded proportionality and governance responsive to change, without endorsing a particular economy-wide AI statute. Says regulatory adequacy and capability cannot be inferred from one another. Discloses a commercial governance system under development.

Key points

Quotes are the submitter’s own words. Text taken from documents, including scanned pages read by text-recognition software, can differ from the PDF. Check the original. Listed in the same order as on the submission’s page in the interactive guide.

  1. Argues that a distributed regulatory environment is not in itself evidence that the framework is inadequate or that more regulation is required.

    The distributed nature of this environment is not, of itself, evidence that Australia's regulatory framework is inadequate or that additional regulation is required.

  2. Argues, citing APRA supervisory findings it describes as limited to regulated entities, that recognising that obligations apply differs from having the organisational capability to operationalise governance.

    These findings are important but bounded. They concern APRA-regulated entities examined through a particular supervisory exercise and should not be extrapolated to Australian organisations generally or to SMEs. They nevertheless demonstrate that recognising that existing obligations apply and possessing the organisational capability to operationalise governance are not necessarily the same thing.

  3. Argues that a governance-capability gap alone does not establish a gap in substantive law, and adequate regulatory coverage does not establish organisational governance capability.

    Evidence of an organisational governance capability gap should not, by itself, be treated as evidence of a gap in substantive law. Equally, adequate regulatory coverage should not be assumed to establish adequate organisational governance capability.

  4. Argues that proportionality should lessen governance burden without lessening accountability or protection from harm.

    Proportionality should reduce unnecessary governance burden without proportionately reducing accountability or protection from harm.

  5. Argues that the aim should be appropriate governance, neither maximal nor minimal.

    The objective should therefore be neither maximum governance nor minimum governance, but appropriate governance: sufficient to support informed and accountable decisions while avoiding unnecessary process burden.

Recommendations

Recommendations are shown beside the submission’s own words. Listed in the same order as on its page in the interactive guide.

  1. Distinguish substantive regulatory coverage from organisational governance capability when assessing existing AI laws; infer neither a legal gap from a capability gap nor adequate capability from adequate coverage.

    In considering the adequacy of Australia's existing laws and regulatory frameworks as they apply to AI, distinguish between whether substantive laws and regulatory frameworks adequately address AI-related conduct and consequences, and whether organisations can practically identify and govern their AI activity and operationalise the requirements and governance considerations relevant to it. Evidence of an organisational governance capability gap should not, by itself, be treated as evidence of a gap in substantive law. Equally, adequate regulatory coverage should not be assumed to establish adequate organisational governance capability.

    A program corrected obvious text-recognition errors in this quote for display.

  2. Develop better Australian evidence on organisations' practical AI-governance capability and barriers to it, particularly among SMEs, family businesses and regional organisations, to determine whether any response is warranted before assuming new regulation is required.

    Develop better Australian evidence about organisations' practical AI-governance capability and the barriers to establishing that capability, particularly among SM Es, family businesses and regional organisations. This evidence should help determine whether material capability gaps exist, how they affect responsible AI adoption, and whether any response is warranted before assuming that new regulatory intervention is required.

    A program corrected obvious text-recognition errors in this quote for display.

  3. Apply proportionality considering organisational circumstances and AI consequences for affected people, without diminishing legal obligations, accountability or protection; organisational size alone should not determine governance attention.

    In future AI policy, guidance, adoption support and regulatory design, apply proportionality in a way that considers both organisational circumstances and the nature, context and potential consequences of AI activity, including consequences for affected people. Proportionality should reduce unnecessary governance complexity and burden without diminishing applicable legal obligations, accountability or protection appropriate to the consequences of an AI use. Organisational size alone should not determine the level of governance attention required.

    A program corrected obvious text-recognition errors in this quote for display.

  4. Encourage AI governance integrated with existing arrangements and proportionate reassessment after material changes in systems, uses, suppliers, organisational circumstances or external requirements; avoid unnecessary duplication.

    Where Australian Government policy, guidance or adoption initiatives address organisational AI governance, encourage approaches that can integrate with existing organisational governance and remain capable of proportionate reassessment following material changes in AI systems, their uses, suppliers, organisational circumstances or relevant external requirements. The objective should be practical governance capability that can remain responsive across the AI lifecycle, rather than unnecessary duplication of existing organisational governance arrangements.

    A program corrected obvious text-recognition errors in this quote for display.

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In some quotes a program corrected obvious text-recognition errors for display.

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