Assess and manage dependence on external AI providers as a resilience risk
21 submissions. Each submission counts once for this shared ask. Counts do not measure importance or merit.
A shared ask groups requests for substantially the same action from three or more submissions when the group was created. Groups remain listed if withdrawals reduce their counts. AI models summarised recommendations, grouped them and checked the groups. The label summarises the requests; it is not a quote. A shared ask does not mean agreement on anything else.
Theme: Dependence on foreign AI providers
Recommendations from submissions
Quotes are the submitter’s own words. Text taken from documents, including scanned pages read by text-recognition software, can differ from the PDF. Check the original. Extracts are chosen by an AI model. Submissions are listed in submission number order; recommendations follow their order on each submission’s page.
Humanware Institute Submission 64
Apply a Critical AI Dependency Test to significant Commonwealth AI investments and critical systems.
Apply a Critical AI Dependency Test to significant Commonwealth AI investments and to critical systems, so Australia can see where it relies on particular models, cloud and compute infrastructure, data, vendors or technical standards.
Tata Consultancy Services Submission 75
Treat AI compute as strategic national infrastructure, assessed for resilience, continuity and geopolitical exposure, not solely on cost or availability.
Treat AI compute as strategic national infrastructure, assessed for resilience, continuity and geopolitical exposure — not solely on cost or availability.
Vault Submission 84
Equip regulators and the national security community to identify AI dependencies and disruption impacts, informing risk monitoring and responses to compromised access, availability or control.
For Australia, this means regulators and the national security community need the capability to identify material dependencies across AI compute, cloud, software, data and supply chains, and understand how their disruption could affect critical capabilities. This should inform how emerging AI risks are monitored and how Australia prepares to respond when access, availability or control is compromised.
Chameleon Confidential Solutions Pty Ltd Submission 99
Recommendation 6: build on existing frameworks to assess strategic AI dependencies across government and critical sectors: control, jurisdiction, concentration, privileged access, substitutability, continuity, domestic capability and denial, compromise or supplier-change consequences.
Build on existing technology-security and supplier-assurance frameworks by establishing a consistent, risk-based approach to strategically significant AI dependencies across government and critical sectors. Assessment should consider effective control, jurisdiction, concentration, privileged access, substitutability, continuity, domestic capability and consequences of denial, compromise or material supplier change.
Macquarie Technology Group Submission 138
Determine which AI capabilities are important enough to national resilience that continuity of access must be assured, and which dependencies can be managed through diversification, contractual safeguards or trusted access.
Government should determine which AI capabilities are sufficiently important to national resilience that continuity of access must be assured, and which dependencies can be managed through diversification, contractual safeguards or trusted access.
Social Cyber Institute Submission 165
Build national AI capability without unmanaged dependence on foreign models, infrastructure or providers, focusing on data residency, model behaviour, inference and auditability.
The central policy task is to build national AI capability without creating unmanaged dependence on foreign models, infrastructure or providers. This means focusing on the main control layers that will enhance sovereignty: data residency, model behaviour, inference, and auditability.
NCC Group Submission 185
Use Commonwealth procurement and critical infrastructure risk management to address material AI dependencies, including supply-chain concentration, FOCI, foreign-jurisdiction exposure, portability, continuity and exit.
Use Commonwealth procurement and critical infrastructure risk management to address material AI dependencies, including supply-chain concentration, FOCI, foreign-jurisdiction exposure, portability, continuity and exit.
GovTech Australia Submission 258
Establish a Sovereign AI Continuity Requirement: foreign-inference services need executable Australian alternatives proportionate to service-loss consequences; materially AI-dependent functions need tested pathways sustaining defined minimum service through prolonged disruption.
The Commonwealth should establish a Sovereign AI Continuity Requirement. AI services relying on foreign- controlled inference should maintain an executable Australian-based alternative pathway appropriate to the consequence of service loss. For functions materially dependent on AI, that pathway should be tested and capable of sustaining a defined minimum level of service during a prolonged disruption.
Monash University Submission 277
Assess dependence on external AI providers as a strategic resilience risk, including mapping systemic dependencies and establishing continuity and contingency arrangements.
assessing dependence on external AI providers as a strategic resilience risk, including mapping systemic dependencies and establishing continuity and contingency arrangements.
Mr Noah Quinlan Submission 365
For government and critical-infrastructure AI, require dependency mapping, secure updates, incident reporting, supply-chain assurance, tested fallbacks and safe operation when foreign providers or critical components are unavailable.
Systems used by government and critical infrastructure should therefore be subject to stronger requirements than ordinary consumer applications. Those requirements should include dependency mapping, secure update mechanisms, incident reporting, supply-chain assurance, tested fallback arrangements and the ability to operate safely if a foreign provider or critical component becomes unavailable.
Mr Andrew Ford Submission 412
Require annual Office of AI, ACCC and DTA reports to Parliament on Commonwealth cloud/model dependency: provider spend overriding aggregate-disclosure confidentiality restrictions, workload concentration, estimated switching costs, and government-data/telemetry-use contractual terms.
Recommend that the Office of AI, the ACCC and the DTA report annually to Parliament on Commonwealth cloud and foundation-model dependency: spend by provider (overriding contractual confidentiality restrictions on aggregate disclosure), workload concentration, estimated switching costs, and the contractual terms governing provider use of government data and telemetry.
Mr Raffaele D'Angelo Submission 431
Establish a cross-government AI dependency and resilience assessment for critical and high-impact uses, covering provider concentration, cyber risk, continuity, substitutability, foreign dependency and exit capability.
Establish a cross-government AI dependency and resilience assessment for critical and high-impact uses, covering provider concentration, cyber risk, continuity, substitutability, foreign dependency and exit capability.
Ms Joanna Giannone Submission 437
Establish minimum resilience requirements for critical organisations: human-readable knowledge retention, independent records, data portability, tested recovery, meaningful human override and ability to operate without a particular AI provider.
Government should establish minimum resilience requirements for critical organisations: human-readable knowledge retention, independent records, data portability, tested recovery procedures, meaningful human override and the ability to continue essential operations without a particular AI provider.
Name withheld Submission 443
That concentration of dependency on a small number of AI providers be monitored as a systemic risk, on a basis comparable to financial system supervision.
Mrs Kathleen McGuire Submission 452
Task the Australian AI Safety Institute with formally assessing continuity-of-access and supplychain risk for any critical national function reliant on foreign frontier AI infrastructure.
Mr Craig Thomler Submission 466
Include service-withdrawal risk in the Australian AI Safety Institute’s technical-evaluation remit.
Give the Australian AI Safety Institute a strategic technical-evaluation role including foreign dependency, supply-chain concentration and service-withdrawal risks.
The AI Accelerator Submission 481
Incorporate AI provider dependency into critical infrastructure continuity obligations, make model portability the default for government and critical infrastructure deployments, and pursue allied access arrangements.
Incorporate AI provider dependency into continuity obligations for critical infrastructure and essential services, make model portability the default for government and critical infrastructure deployments, and pursue allied access arrangements so Australian entities are not caught by blanket foreign controls.
Mr Kelvin Chau Submission 494
For AI-supported systems inside critical infrastructure (energy, water, health, finance), make redundancy across model sources with outputs compared a procurement requirement.
For the AI-supported systems inside critical infrastructure, energy, water, health, finance, the same discipline is a procurement requirement, redundancy across model sources with outputs compared
Mr Craig Weniton Submission 502
Require critical operators to plan for provider withdrawal, degradation or compromise, and extend a subsidised AI-assisted security service to small suppliers in critical supply chains.
require critical operators to plan for provider withdrawal, degradation or compromise, and extend a subsidised AI-assisted security service to small suppliers in critical supply chains (see Recommendation 15).
Mr Stephen Elliott Submission 508
Require government bodies procuring AI for critical functions to record provider jurisdiction and maintain both plans and tools to substitute models.
Government require its bodies procuring AI for critical functions to record provider jurisdiction and maintain a plan and tools to substitute models.
Ms Jessica Browne Submission 555
Undertake a National AI Economic Dependency and Systemic Resilience Assessment mapping dependence on major cloud, AI, accounting, payroll, banking, payments, superannuation, identity and API infrastructure, and identifying common upstream dependencies and concentration risk.
Undertake a National AI Economic Dependency and Systemic Resilience Assessment. Map Australia's dependence on major cloud, AI, accounting, payroll, banking, payments, superannuation, identity, API and other digital infrastructure. Identify common upstream dependencies and concentration risk, including where apparently competing Australian services rely on the same hyperscaler, model provider or infrastructure.