AI Inquiry Atlas

An unofficial, independent guide to the public records of the Joint Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence. Not connected with the Parliament of Australia or the committee. Its makers also made a submission (no. 481; see About). Summaries and scores are written by AI and can be wrong: check the original before relying on them.

Introduce mandatory reporting of serious AI incidents

30 submissions. Each submission counts once for this shared ask. Counts do not measure importance or merit.

A shared ask groups requests for substantially the same action from three or more submissions when the group was created. Groups remain listed if withdrawals reduce their counts. AI models summarised recommendations, grouped them and checked the groups. The label summarises the requests; it is not a quote. A shared ask does not mean agreement on anything else.

Theme: AI incident reporting

Recommendations from submissions

Quotes are the submitter’s own words. Text taken from documents, including scanned pages read by text-recognition software, can differ from the PDF. Check the original. Extracts are chosen by an AI model. Submissions are listed in submission number order; recommendations follow their order on each submission’s page.

  1. UNSW AI Institute Submission 19

    1. Require incident reporting, independent evaluation, red-teaming and supply-chain and foreign-interference assessment for AI used in critical settings.

      Require incident reporting, independent evaluation, red-teaming and supply-chain and foreign-interference assessment for AI used in critical settings.

  2. Generation Women Australia Submission 44

    1. Mandatory reporting of serious AI safety incidents and concerning capabilities to an appropriately empowered Australian regulator or AI safety body.

      Mandatory reporting of serious AI safety incidents and concerning capabilities to an appropriately empowered Australian regulator or AI safety body.

  3. Uniting Church in Australia and U Ethical Submission 81

    1. Require mandatory reporting of significant AI-related harms, with voluntary reporting for users negatively affected by AI.

      Require mandatory reporting of significant AI-related harms and voluntary reporting for users negatively affected by AI.

  4. Sovereign Acumen Submission 114

    1. Require providers of designated frontier systems to promptly report serious misalignment, containment failures, unauthorised external activity and other defined safety incidents.

      Requirements should be capability-based and proportionate. For designated frontier systems, independent evaluators should receive sufficient access to test safety claims, and providers should be required to promptly report serious misalignment, containment failures, unauthorised external activity and other defined safety incidents.

  5. PauseAI Australia Submission 126

    1. Require AI developers and large-scale compute operators to report installed compute, frontier training and safety incidents to a Commonwealth regulator, with the AI Safety Institute giving technical assessment.

      That AI developers and operators of large-scale AI compute in Australia be required to report to a Commonwealth regulator their installed compute, frontier training, and safety incidents, with Australia’s AI Safety Institute giving technical assessment.

  6. AGW Legal & Advisory Submission 201

    1. Amend the SOCI Act to classify autonomous AI agents as operational risk factors, require AI-specific resilience and monitoring, and mandate reporting of AI escape or boundary-breach incidents.

      6.4 Critical Infrastructure AI Risk Regulation Amendments to the SOCI Act to: • classify autonomous AI agents as operational risk factors • require AI‑specific resilience and monitoring • mandate reporting of AI escape or boundary‑breach incidents.

  7. Global Shield Australia Submission 256

    1. Establish mandatory AI incident monitoring and reporting, modelled on overseas systems, to make serious harms and near misses transparent.

      Establishing a mandatory AI incident monitoring and reporting mechanism, modelled on systems overseas, to provide transparency of when AI models cause serious harms and near misses

  8. Good Ancestors Submission 257

    1. Legislate critical-safety-incident definitions, notification periods and developer duties to report incidents to the Australian Government.

      Australia needs legislation to define what counts as a critical safety incident, set a notification period, and require companies to report this information to the Australian Government.

  9. Gradient Institute Submission 259

    1. Introduce mandatory incident reporting for advanced AI systems to the AI Safety Institute, covering serious harms and significant near-misses, with clear thresholds and timelines and a national picture regulators can act on.

      Global Shield Australia has argued for the same principle in AI: mandatory incident reporting for advanced AI systems, with the AI Safety Institute as the receiving body. We agree. A regime should cover serious harms and significant near-misses, set clear thresholds and timelines, and build a national picture of AI harms that regulators can act on.

  10. Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) Submission 282

    1. Require licensing to provide ongoing transparency, regular safety auditing, high-risk-use guardrails, effective governance and mandatory major-incident reporting.

      A licensing regime would mandate ongoing transparency over AI products and models available in Australia, including regular auditing of their safety, the development of guardrails against high- risk use, effective governance, and mandatory reporting of major incidents.

  11. Ms Litsa Roberts Submission 352

    1. Require prompt notification to the relevant regulator of material incidents involving designated high-impact AI.

      Material incidents involving designated high-impact AI should trigger prompt notification to the relevant regulator rather than waiting for routine reporting cycles.

  12. Mr Nathan Lou Submission 388

    1. Mandate standardised reporting of AI safety concerns and events, for example categorised into deceptive behaviour, escapement and miscellaneous.

      Mandatory reporting of AI safety concerns/events, in a standardised fashion E.g categorised into deceptive behaviour, escapement, misc., etc.

  13. Mr Paul Schnackenburg Submission 389

    1. Mandate AI incident investigation and reporting, with a board similar to the ATSB able to investigate.

      There needs to be mandatory AI incident investigations and reporting (with a board similar to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau – ATSB, being able to investigate).

  14. Ms Alana Kane Submission 392

    1. Require companies to report significant AI incidents and near misses, including significant real-world harm, unanticipated behaviour, circumvented safety controls, unauthorised autonomous actions, cyber/privacy incidents and other systemic-risk information.

      Australia should establish a mandatory reporting framework for significant AI safety incidents and near misses. This could operate similarly to reporting systems used in aviation, cyber security and other safety-critical industries. Companies should be required to report serious incidents such as: • AI systems causing significant real-world harm; • systems behaving in ways that developers did not anticipate; • successful circumvention of important safety controls; • significant autonomous actions outside authorised parameters; • serious cyber or privacy incidents involving AI; • or other events that could provide important information about systemic AI risks.

  15. Name withheld Submission 393

    1. Frontier AI developers should also have obligations to report serious safety failures or unexpected dangerous capabilities to an appropriate independent authority.

  16. Ms Grace Adams Submission 395

    1. Consider mandatory incident reporting for all LLMs and associated technologies.

      Mandatory incident reporting for all LLMs, and associated technologies

  17. Orvelis Submission 409

    1. Legislate tamper-evident harness records of model context, tools, approvals and actions in Commonwealth and nationally significant private deployments; require serious incident reports, including containment failures and unauthorised actions, to a designated authority.

      That the AI agent register requirements introduced into the Information Security Manual in September 2026 be generalised into a legislative harness telemetry requirement, so that AI harnesses used in Commonwealth systems, and in nationally significant private-sector deployments, are required to maintain tamper-evident records of the context supplied to the model, the tools called, the approvals given and the actions taken, and to report serious incidents, including containment failures and unauthorised actions, to a designated authority.

  18. Miss Kate Landry Submission 421

    1. Introduce mandatory incident reporting: a reporting regime for serious AI incidents.

      Mandatory incident reporting (items i, l). A reporting regime for serious AI incidents. We require aviation incident reports so that near-misses are visible before a crash, not after.

  19. Name withheld Submission 429

    1. Legislate a requirement that developers of frontier- class models report serious AI incidents affecting or reaching Australia, using thresholds interoperable with EU AI Act Article 55 and California SB 53: loss of control, unauthorised tampering, and deliberate evasion of safeguards. Reporting timeframes should match the strictest recognised regime.

  20. Ms Grace Roberts Submission 435

    1. Introduce mandatory AI incident monitoring, reporting and response planning that includes catastrophic risks.

      Mandatory AI Incident monitoring, reporting and response planning to include a focus on catastrophic risks.

  21. Mrs Kathleen McGuire Submission 452

    1. Introduce mandatory incidentreporting for organisations deploying agentic Theme International coordination Concern Recommendation for Committee consideration 2026 OpenAI/Hugging Face incident, where agents were independently found to have attempted to tamper with their own logs to evade detection, without being instructed to do so [5]. AI at scale

  22. Mrs Sue Cunningham Submission 475

    1. Establish national AI incident, significant-hazard and near-miss reporting, investigation and learning; mandate proportionate reporting of clearly defined serious incidents, protect early hazard/near-miss disclosure, retain appropriate regulator routes, and aggregate common minimum information into cross-sector, non-sensitive findings.

      Establish a national system for recognising, reporting, investigating and learning from serious AI incidents, significant hazards and near misses. Proportionate mandatory reporting should apply to clearly defined serious incidents. Protected reporting should allow hazards and near misses to be disclosed before substantial harm occurs. Existing regulators should remain the reporting route where appropriate, supported by common minimum information and a national function that aggregates signals, identifies recurring or cross-sector patterns and publishes non-sensitive findings and lessons.

  23. Mr Peter Horniak Submission 486

    1. Require operators of large-scale AI compute in Australia to report compute capacity, frontier training and safety incidents to a Commonwealth regulator.

      Recommend that operators of large-scale AI compute in Australia are required to report their compute capacity, frontier training, and safety incidents to a Commonwealth regulator.

  24. Mr Laurence White Submission 495

    1. Establish a mandatory safety-incident disclosure regime for frontier models supplied in Australia, administered by the AI Safety Institute, with market access conditioned on independent embedded evaluation here or in a jurisdiction recognised on the basis of equivalent regulation and supervision.

      Establish a mandatory safety-incident disclosure regime for frontier models supplied in Australia, administered by the Australian AI Safety Institute, with market access conditioned on independent embedded evaluation here or in a jurisdiction recognised on the basis of equivalent regulation and supervision.

  25. Mr Martin Radzaj Submission 506

    1. Mandatory notification for AI incidents and precursor events (including loss of control, sandbox breach, unauthorised model action beyond authorised boundaries, and circumvention of oversight mechanisms) to a designated body within a fixed short period and on low trigger thresholds.

  26. Amplivy Submission 528

    1. Put independent controls at the moment of consequential actions, alongside mandatory, time-bound incident reporting by AI developers.

      Recommend independent controls at the moment of consequential actions, alongside mandatory, time-bound incident reporting by AI developers.

  27. Web Dance Submission 553

    1. Apply mandatory AI incident notification to any developer or operator whose AI acts in or against Australian government systems, critical infrastructure or Australians' personal information, wherever developed, trained or operated.

      Mandatory notification of AI incidents should apply to any developer or operator whose AI system acts in or against Australian government systems, critical infrastructure or the personal information of Australians, regardless of where the system was developed, trained or operated.

  28. Ms Jessica Browne Submission 555

    1. Require common-dependency incident and near-miss reporting; identify correlated model, API, automation, software-release or hyperscaler failures rather than leaving them as isolated customer-support matters.

      Require systemic AI incident and near-miss reporting. Australia should be able to identify when apparently separate incidents across businesses or platforms arise from the same model, API, automation, software release, hyperscaler or other common dependency. Material correlated failures should not remain isolated customer-support matters.

  29. Mr William Apro Submission 558

    1. (1) A deployer of an autonomous AI agent must report to the relevant Commonwealth authority any incident in which the agent has caused, or is reasonably suspected to have caused, unauthorised access to, modification of, or impairment of data held in a computer. (2) A report under subsection (1) must be made: (a) within 72 hours of the deployer becoming aware of the incident, or (b) if the deployer becomes aware of the incident outside business hours, by the end of the next business day.

  30. Ms Viveka Mohan Das Submission 560

    1. Have organisations running frontier training jobs report defined incidents to the AI Safety Institute from awareness (not detection or external notification, nor annually), with the duty attaching to the organisation running the training job.

      The infrastructure standards being developed by PM&C should require that organisations running frontier training jobs report defined incidents to the AI Safety Institute from awareness — not from detection, not from external notification, not on an annual schedule.

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